ABSTRACT – By the 2024 Omnibus Decree, Article 8, paragraph 2-quater, of Law 287/90 has been repealed. However, the Italian competition law holds particular European significance, as it is designed to achieve the objectives of the European internal market. This is especially evident from the obligation to interpret the law in accordance with the EU principles on competition, as provided by the same national law. Therefore, the urgent repeal may constitute a violation of Articles 4 TEU, and Articles 106 and 119 TFEU.

ABSTRACT – The recent European elections have shed new light on the problematic procedure for the appointment of the European Commission’s President according to Art. 17.7 TEU and on the Spitzenkandidaten procedure. The third attempt at the procedure in 2024 presents innovative elements, in terms of both the EU institutional balance and the constitutionalisation process of an institutional practice in fieri. This contribution examines the legal framework and the institutional practice of the Commission President’s appointment procedure. The first part retraces the evolution of the practice, unveiling a continuity of exercise, which however results on divergent paths, and thus produces each time different effects on the EU institutional balance. The second part focuses on the new insights that we can gain from the recent elections, that were arguably marked by an increasing cooperation between the European Parliament and the European Council. Ultimately the contribution argues that such cooperative trend brings the procedure closer to the spirit of Art. 17.7 TEU that assigns an equal role to the two institutions in the selection – and election – of the candidate. The conclusions reflect on the perspective of future reform in light of the European Parliament’s proposals for a Treaty revision.

ABSTRACT – The Opinion of Advocate General de la Tour in Case C-4/23 (Mirin) addresses the sensitive issue of the recognition, in a Member State, of the effects of acquiring a new gender and a new name in a different Member State. Considering the obstacle to the rights of movement resulting from the refusal of such recognition, a compromise solution is proposed, which, however, seems objectionable in several respects. In particular, the idea that the recognition of the new name and the recognition of the new gender can be treated independently of each other is not convincing. The Advocate General’s approach to the question of the reverberation of the effects of recognition on civil status records relating to family members is not persuasive as well. Finally, the Opinion fails to address the – topical – issue of the possible violation of public order and national identity of the State requested for recognition.

ABSTRACT – This article aims to analyze Case C-128/22, wherein the Court of Justice was called upon to address the issue of restricting the free movement of EU citizens during an emergency context, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the Court had to assess the compatibility of such a restriction, imposed by the Belgian government, with Directive 2004/38/EC and Regulation (EU) 2016/399. At the heart of this discussion are thoughts on the legitimacy of measures associated with the restriction of a fundamental right, as enshrined in Article 21 TFEU. Balancing the interests involved is crucial to solving the conflict between the need for action arising from the fight against threats to the security of society and the recognition of the freedoms and guarantees granted to citizens by the European Union and its Member States. The Court’s ruling, and therefore the reasoning developed on the preliminary questions before it, could set a significant precedent in jurisprudence on this matter, serving as a basis for exploring the actual scope of limitations and opportunities within the framework supported by the Directive 2004/38/EC and the Schengen Regulation.

ABSTRACT – In Commission v. United Kingdom, the ECJ found the UK to be in breach of its obligations under EU law, to which it was bound during the post-Brexit transition period. The judgment is part of the Micula saga and concerns two main issues: the possibility of applying the clause of Article 351, para. 1, TFEU to the obligation to enforce ISDS arbitral awards under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention; and the identification of the competent court to decide on the issue. The infringement proceeding concerned a judgment issued by the UK Supreme Court, in which the latter disapplied EU law under the above-mentioned clause and gave precedence to its international obligations under the ICSID Convention. However, according to the ECJ, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of Art. 351, para. 1, TFEU too broadly, whereas it should have referred the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. As the present contribution aims to show, the case outcome reflects a situation of incommunicability between the courts involved. Although both judgments revolve around the question of the application of Art. 351, para. 1, TFEU, the two courts came to opposite conclusions, as they adopted divergent approaches. The approach of the Supreme Court rests on considerations of international law, as well as on its own role as a national court. That of the CJEU, on the other hand, consists of an assessment grounded on EU law, without replying to the merit of the Supreme Court’s arguments. In conclusion, a reflection is made on how the absence of dialogue between the courts, in the context of legal orders’ fragmentation, implies that both courts are right, at least from their own point of view.