The recent European elections have shed new light on the problematic procedure for the appointment of the European Commission’s President according to Art. 17.7 TEU and on the Spitzenkandidaten procedure. The third attempt at the procedure in 2024 presents innovative elements, in terms of both the EU institutional balance and the constitutionalisation process of an institutional practice in fieri. This contribution examines the legal framework and the institutional practice of the Commission President’s appointment procedure. The first part retraces the evolution of the practice, unveiling a continuity of exercise, which however results on divergent paths, and thus produces each time different effects on the EU institutional balance. The second part focuses on the new insights that we can gain from the recent elections, that were arguably marked by an increasing cooperation between the European Parliament and the European Council. Ultimately the contribution argues that such cooperative trend brings the procedure closer to the spirit of Art. 17.7 TEU that assigns an equal role to the two institutions in the selection – and election – of the candidate. The conclusions reflect on the perspective of future reform in light of the European Parliament’s proposals for a Treaty revision.
