ABSTRACT – This article examines the judgment in Case C‑457/23, P Deutsche Lufthansa AG v Ryanair DAC and Condor Flugdienst GmbH, in which the Court of Justice upheld the annulment of the Commission decision authorising Lufthansa’s recapitalisation under section 3.11 of the 2020 COVID‑19 State Aid Temporary Framework. Starting from the reconstruction of the Temporary Framework and its amendments, notably the second one, which opened the door to recapitalisation and subordinated debt for non‑financial undertakings, the paper highlights how these instruments produced significant imbalances across Member States and sectors, with enduring effects on the competitive structure of the internal market. Against this background, the article situates the “Ryanair saga”, in which Europe’s largest low‑cost carrier brought more than twenty actions against Commission decisions authorising COVID‑19 aid to national airlines, alleging breaches of the principle of non‑discrimination, defects in proportionality and insufficient fact‑finding. The Lufthansa judgment is analysed through three main lenses: the Court’s treatment of the third ground of appeal concerning point 67 of the Temporary Framework, the characterisation of the Commission soft law instruments as a set of self‑binding “rules of conduct”, and the limits of judicial review over complex economic assessments in State aid cases. The article argues that the Court contributes to “hardening” crisis frameworks and strengthening the duty to state reasons, with practical implications for future emergency legislation based on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
